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ords and treatises and liberality in qualification of the medical expert are
among the infiltrators. The fear expressed by the medical profession is
that the scale is tipping too far, especially in such liberal states as Cali-
fornia. There may be justification for such apprehension, but the con-
sequences are not inevitable - for if the physician comes into court with
an open and impartial mind, seeking the truth, the scales will strike a
balance.
HAROLD FRIEDMAN
Absolute Liability For Failure To Settle
Below Policy Limits
"Is an indemnity policy to be a shield in the hands of the assured or
a sword in the hands of its antagonist?"'
The following fact situation is illustrative of the problems with which
this article will be concerned: The insurance company issues a liability
policy to Insured with a $10,000 per person limitation of liability. Claim-
ant alleges that due to insured's negligence he has suffered injuries for
which he claims $40,000. However, claimant graciously offers to settle
for $9,000. The company refuses settlement. The case is tried and
claimant recovers $20,000.2
It is clear that a conflict in interests has arisen in this situation be-
cause of the presence of these elements: (1) A claim against the insured
for an amount in excess of the policy limits and (2) An offer to com-
promise the claim for a figure within such limits. The primary conflict
arises out of the fact that the policyholder desires any settlement so long
as it is within the policy limits, while the insurer is increasingly tempted
to gamble with trial as the settlement figure approaches the limits of the
policy, since he has less to lose.3 There has been a mass of litigation up-
on the very problem set forth herein - costly litigation which is certain
to continue and expand until the evolution of the law strikes upon a more
satisfactory solution than that now being provided.4 Because of the pres-
ence of conflicting interests, the following questions arise: (1) Does the
'Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 587, 43 Ad. 503, 505
(1899).
'This article will be confined to consideration of settlement problems only, although
its reasoning also applies to the analogous problems presented by a failure of the
insurer to undertake or continue in defense of a claim. See 40 A.L.R.2d 168
(1955).
'Ga. Life Ins. Co. v. Miss. Cent. R.R. Co., 116 Miss. 114, 76 So. 646 (1917);
VANCE, INSURANCE 1004 (3d ed. 1951); 13 U. CMI. L REv. 105 (1945).
'Comment, 48 Mic. L. REV. 95 (1949); Note, 60 YALE I.J. 1037 (1951).
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company have a duty to the insured to settle within the limits of the
policy? If so, what is its scope and by what standard is it to be judged?5
(2) What can the insured do in case of a violation of this duty?
(3) What is the practical result of an attempt to prove a violation of this
duty by the insured?
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS
The typical policy provision provides: ". . . the company may make
such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient." At first, courts construed this contractual provision
very narrowly and held there was no duty to settle.6 "The contract must
govern ... (and) whether the interests of the insured were sufficiently
guarded, it is unnecessary to consider. ' 7 It was not long until the courts
realized that this rule failed to give adequate protection to the insured.8
The judiciary decided that there should be a duty imposed upon the in-
surer in regard to settlement. But - aid now we come to the most per-
plexing question of all - by what standard is this duty to be judged?9
The rationale behind the imposition of a duty in this situation is that
since the company's actions affect the interest of the insured, it should
be required to assume responsibility for its exercise.10 Obviously, when
the company decides to defend, the insured is involuntarily burdened with
the bulk of the risk and at the same time is deprived of virtually any
voice in the matter. Of course, insured is often permitted to hire his own
attorney and participate in the litigation, but this does not lessen the
problem, since the company still maintains the exclusive right to decide
on settlement. It was as a result of this inequality of position that the
courts concluded that protection must be given the insured despite any
contractual provision to the contrary."
'Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REV.
1136 (1954).
'Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 Ad. 503 (1899);
Schmidt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 Ad. 653 (1914).
7Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 587, 43 Ad. 503, 506
(1899).
'New Orleans & Cent. R.R. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 114 La. 153, 38 So. 89 (1905);
Schenke Piano Co. v. Phila. Cas. Co., 216 N.Y. 662, 110 N.E. 1049 (1915); Kin-
gan & Co. v. Marland Cas. Co., 65 Ind. App. 301, 115 N.E. 348 (1917); Cleveland
Wire Spring v. Gen. Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 6 Ohio App. 344 (1917).
'Comment, 48 MICH. L REV. 95 (1949).
"
0Ga. Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932); Cunningham, Lia-
bility In Excess Of Policy Limits, 1957 INs. L. J. 483 (Aug. 1957); 13 U. CM. L.
R v. 105 (1945).




The mere election to defend does not make the insurer liable for a
judgment in excess of the policy limits,'2 but he may be liable if certain
elements are in evidence. There are two lines of authority. The diversity
stems from the question of whether the insurer's obligation is only to re-
frain from acting in "bad faith"'13 or whether it must come up to a stand-
ard of "due care '14 in its actions. Bad faith usually consists of the com-
pany intentionally disregarding the interests of the insured.15 Negligence
consists in the rejection of an offer which a reasonable businessman
would have accepted.' Obviously the variations on the elements consti-
tuting "negligence" and "bad faith" are vast 17 and many times the two
doctrines tend to coalesce.18
CRITICISM OF THE "NIEGLIGENCE" AND "BAD FAiH" TESTS
"One line is run here, another there. We have a filigree of threads
and cross threads, radiating from the center and dividing one another into
sections and cross sections."' 9  The preceding quotation aptly describes
the prevailing situation as to what constitutes "good faith" or "reasonable-
'Ga. Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932); Hart v. Rep. Mut.
Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (1949); VANCE, INSURANCE 1004 (3d
ed. 1951).
"Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934); Christian v.
Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. 89 F. Supp. 888 (N.D.Cal. 1950); Ga. Cas. Co. v. Mann,
242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932); Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 298
Mass. 141, 10 N.E.2d 82 (1937); Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 645,
225 N.W. 643 (1929); Farmers Gin Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 186
Miss. 747, 191 So. 415 (1939); Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228
S.W.2d 750 (1950); Hart v. Republic Mu. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N.E.2d
347 (1949); Johnson v. Hardware Mu. Cas. Co., 108 Vt. 269, 187 Ad. 788
(1936).
"
4 Cavanaugh v. Gen. Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 79 N.H. 186, 106 Ad. 604
(1919); Tyger River Pine Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933);
Universal Auto. Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 54 S.W.2d 1061 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932);
Ballard v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Co., 86 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1936).
'So. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1952);
Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cos. Co., 108 Vt. 269, 187 Ad. 788 (1936).
"'Comment, 48 MCI-. L Rv. 95 (1949).
'
7If insurer knows he only has an equal chance of winning and also if he loses the
verdict will exceed policy limits, he has a higher standard to live up to. Nat'l Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Britt, 203 Okla. 175, 200 P.2d 407 (1948). It can be stated that bad
faith is a state of mind. However, the state of mind may be inferred from the cir-
cumstances and the acts of the insurance company's agents. Johnson v. Hardware
Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817 (1938).
'See Annor., 40 A.LR.2d 168, 186 (1955), pointing out that in many cases the
courts have equated good faith with negligence, or at least held that negligence might
be an element of bad faith.
" Cardozo, as quoted in 1957 INs. L. J. 483, 493 (Aug. 1957).
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ness." Aside from the almost imperceptible distinction in the practical
application of the two terms, there has been a conspicuous failure on the
part of the courts to come forward with any express statement regarding
the relative weight to be given the interests of the parties by the insurer
when it deliberates settlement.20 Ostensibly, it would appear that "equal
consideration" would be the most equitable. However, by saying "equal
consideration" must be given to the conflicting interests, a jury question
is usually presented and this is one of the chief weaknesses in the appli-
cation of either test.21 It does not appear consonant with justice that
the insured should be exposed to the hazard of unenlightened jury action
in this situation. Apart from the difficulties a jury is confronted with
in dealing with the vague notion of either test in this area, another prob-
lem is apparent. The attention of the jury is seldom directed to the fact
that the insurer's decision to defend was not accompanied by a propor-
tionate share of the risk.22  In the vast majority of cases the only evidence
against the company is a simple refusal to settle, which amounts to neither
negligence nor bad faith.
It is obvious that neither rule eliminates the source of all difficulty in
this area - the divergent interests of insurer and insured in regard to
settlement.23 The company hopes that the insured will come forward
with an airtight defense so that it can deny liability completely, but the
policyholder finds himself in a position of jeopardy. If the insured as-
serts that he was without fault the company will refuse to settle and a
verdict in excess of the policy limits may well go against the insured.
Presently, the insurer is inevitably influenced by two factors. If it
makes a bad guess as to the outcome, it need not bear all the consequent
financial burden. 24 "It may legitimately be inferred that the all control-
ling motive of the company was to get out of these cases as cheaply as
possible."25  And here it is well to realize that when the interests of the
parties are to be weighed against each other, the actor's state of mind may
be an important factor in the scale. Secondly, it is aware of the fact that
it has the insured virtually at its mercy and may deliberately gamble with
insured's money in refusing to settle - knowing the policyholder's diffi-
culty in proving bad faith in a separate action.26
'0 Comment, 48 MIcH. L REV. 95 (1949).
2 Ibid.
m See Note, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1436 (1955) discussing "duty to defend."
"Ibid.
213 U. Ct. L. Ray. 105 (1945).
'Ga. Life Ins. Co. v. Miss Cent. R.R. Co., 116 Miss, 114, 122, 76 So. 646, 649
(1917) (dissent).




By conferring absolute power to control litigation and settlements up-
on the insurance company without a pro rata responsibility for the con-
sequences, the courts have created an inequitable relationship which must
result in hardship to the insured.2 7  It appears that the best solution to
the problem would be the existence of a relationship between the com-
pany and the insured which is less dependent on issues of fact.28 It is
more expedient and less harsh from a standpoint of "social engineering ' 29
to make the liability of the company in this situation so extensive as to
cover all excess over the policy limits30 Such a doctrine would virtually
compel the company to act reasonably.3 ' Actually, the problem is to de-
termine the manner in which the law may most effectively adjust the
rights of the parties in the light of the social interests involved. The
company should be held liable here "merely because, as a matter of 'social
engineering,' the conclusion is that the responsibility should be his."3 2
Today, we are backing down from the position that "fault" involves
a large element of moral blame - "social fault" does not necessarily coin-
cide with blameworthiness.33 When the insurance company decides to
contest rather than settle, there is usually neither certainty of harm on the
one hand nor a great risk of harm, which might constitute negligence,
on the other. Here "there is an irreducible risk of harm which can't be
avoided, a risk which the reasonable man would take . . .,,84 because re-
fusal to settle has great utility in the sense that it is essential to combat
flagrant; false and vexatious claims. In other words, the fact that the
insurance company decides to contest rather than settle is an activity
which may be valuable to the community.3 5 But is there anything in-
consistent or immoral with saying to the company, "We will not stop you
from doing this, but if you go ahead and do it for your own purposes
'See Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950), a case
in which the court said the insurance company was bound to sacrifice its interests in
favor of the insured. A logical extension of this would compel the insurer to settle
whenever given the opportunity to do so within the policy limits.
2PROSSER, TORTS § 3 (2d ed. 1955).
21Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 110 (1908). '"he law is utilitar-
ian. It exists for the realization of the reasonable needs of the community. That is
why on many occasions the innocent must suffer and the wicked go unpunished."
' Comment, 48 MICH. L. REv. 95 (1949).
21 Ibid.
'PROSSER, TORTS § 3 at 14 (2d ed: 1955).
"For an excellent discussion on the failure of lawyers to appreciate absolute liability
in tort law, see, ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 32 (1941).
S Ibid.
"PROSSER, supra note 32.
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